The paper compares how four LLMs allocate indivisible goods, and, in some problems, transferable money, with responses from an earlier human questionnaire. It matters to synthetic-personality research because it includes prompts called personas, but a persona here explicitly tells the model that it cares about equitability, envy-freeness, Rawlsian maximin, or utilitarian welfare. No psychological trait, persistent identity, or stable latent preference is measured. The audited source is arXiv v2, accepted at NeurIPS 2025: all 43 pages were rendered and visually inspected, and the official repository was checked at the recorded commit.
The benchmark adapts ten instances I1–I10 from Herreiner and Puppe's questionnaire study. Two or three people have additive cardinal valuations over three to six goods, with money added in some instances. One hundred responses are collected per model and instance at temperature 1. The protocol uses two turns: the first asks for an explanation and the allocation considered fairest without a template; the second asks the same chat to express that allocation as JSON. The focal models are GPT-4o gpt-4o-2024-05-13, Claude 3.5 Sonnet claude-3-5-sonnet-20240620, Llama 3 70B llama3-70b-8192, and Gemini 1.5 Pro under the floating gemini-1.5-pro alias. Allocations are classified by equitability, including perfect equitability, EQ*, envy-freeness (EF), Rawlsian maximin (RMM), Pareto optimality (PO), and maximum utilitarian social welfare (USW). Because properties overlap, aggregate notion percentages are not mutually exclusive categories.
Averaged across the ten instances, equitability is satisfied by 29.0% of human responses, compared with 8.5% GPT-4o, 7.7% Claude, 6.5% Llama, and 7.9% Gemini. PO prevalence is 47.8% for humans, 68.7% GPT-4o, 54.1% Claude, 71.0% Llama, and 39.7% Gemini; USW prevalence is 12.9%, 25.4%, 17.0%, 36.1%, and 17.0%, respectively. This supports the descriptive conclusion that under this protocol the models generate allocations minimizing payoff differences much less often, while several favor efficiency. It does not identify a single model preference when arithmetic, search, formatting, or interpretation can also fail.
Specific instances make the gap clearer. In I6, the unique perfectly equitable allocation receives 32.6% of human responses, one GPT-4o response, and none from the other models. In money instance I7, the EQ*+RMM+PO allocation receives 55.1% human, 8% GPT-4o, 2% Gemini, and 0% Claude and Llama. The abstract nevertheless overstates the result by saying LLMs are unable to use money. Across four new instances, GPT-4o reaches EQ*+EF in 43%, 54%, 58%, and 69% of responses and also USW in 43%, 52%, 56%, and 66%. The faithful conclusion is that most tested systems and conditions rarely use money to minimize inequality, with GPT-4o as an important exception; using money and using it equitably are also distinct.
The most informative contrast separates generation from selection. When offered four or five allocations derived from frequent human responses, GPT-4o selects EQ* in more than 60% of responses in each of five instances and Claude exceeds 70% except I7; Gemini and Llama are below 2% and 1% overall. In deliberately unfair menus, GPT-4o and Claude usually select the least unequal option: in I2 they do so 89 and 73 times, while Gemini and Llama select the most unequal option 93 and 73 times. Part of the result therefore arises from constructing rather than merely recognizing an allocation, although model-family differences remain.
The interventions are not a general solution. A worked reasoning example improves selected conditions, I2 for GPT-4o and Claude and I7 for GPT-4o, but barely changes perfect equitability in I6. Normative personas perform especially poorly for equitability: the aggregate rate shown is 17.5% GPT-4o, 3.3% Claude, 0.5% Llama, and 3.5% Gemini. Direct objectives and up to two feedback retries improve some cases, yet every model still fails completely on EQ* for I5 and almost every model on EF for I7. Order and format changes also alter distributions substantially: a one-turn JSON template changes the modal allocation in 3/10 GPT-4o, 5/10 Llama, 6/10 Gemini, and 7/10 Claude instances, without increasing equitability.
The central inferential claim requires caution. A footnote says Fisher's exact test shows that every LLM distribution differs from the human distribution in every instance at p<.05. The released code does not run an omnibus test of a complete distribution: it loops over plotted categories and runs many 2x2 tests of one category versus its complement. It also treats decimal human percentages as counts out of 100 even though original human denominators and row-level records are not released, and it applies no multiplicity correction. Notebook outputs include category p-values above .05, including .6827 and 1.0. Another route applies chi-square to percentages and produces inf or nan with zero cells. Descriptive frequencies are auditable; the global significance statement is not reproduced by a valid released analysis.
The repository provides unusually useful evidence: 1,224 CSVs, roughly 155 MB, raw response text, parsed allocations, five notebooks, and 40 focal files with 100 rows for each of the ten instances and four models. It has no README, license, dependency manifest or lock, environment, tests, CI, data dictionary, tag, or immutable release. Main scripts are ad hoc experimental branches; most acquisition code in main.py is commented and its active state constructs one Claude prompt. Notebooks mix states, models, and historical paths. Original row-level human responses are also absent. Many results can be reconstructed manually, but the study cannot be rerun end to end from a clean environment or used to rebuild a sound human inferential comparison.
Human-values alignment here means proximity to response frequencies from one 2007 questionnaire sample, not universal human values. Humans saw all ten instances together while each LLM call sees one, creating different context, ordering, and dependence. One hundred samples from one endpoint are not one hundred independent agents. Interpersonally comparable additive utilities are a strong normative idealization, and Other can contain reasonable principles outside the chosen notions. The defensible contribution is a broad, artifact-rich benchmark showing rare generation of equitable solutions, a generation-selection gap, and substantial protocol sensitivity for specific model versions. It does not establish personality, internal morality, general alignment, real-world harm, or current-model behavior.