Beckmann and Butlin ask which processes and manifestations associated with an LLM should be attributed to the same mind, if mentalistic language is appropriate at all. The main contribution is philosophical: they compare the model, physical instance, virtual instance, thread and character, defend the virtual instance as the strongest existing candidate, and introduce two alternatives conditional on persona regions: the instance-persona and model-persona views. They organize the mechanistic literature into three hypotheses of unequal strength. Persona vectors as causal gateway features are comparatively well supported; a low-dimensional persona space has promising but limited evidence; and discrete persona regions or basins of attraction remain unconfirmed. Two preliminary Qwen 3 32B experiments suggest that the assistant axis diverges mainly during generation and that editing stored keys and values at assistant-token positions shifts later responses from an Aura register toward system or AI identity. The public CSV reproduces an Aura-score mean shift from 5.50 to 2.11, but this depends on one GPT-4o judge and a rubric designed around that character. The study does not demonstrate consciousness, persistent minds or discrete persons in LLMs; it offers a conditional framework and initial mechanistic evidence.
Research question
Which unit (model, instance, thread, or segment delimited by a persona) should count as the same mental individual in an LLM, and to what extent do attention flows and persona vectors or regions provide mechanistic criteria for deciding it?